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I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the first executive orders signed after his inauguration, President
Donald J. Trump directed the Office of United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to withdraw the United States as a signatory to the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) reached with eleven
Pacific nations during the Obama administration and to “permanently”
withdraw from any further TPP negotiations. President Trump expressly
declared in this document that it was the intention of his administration “to
deal directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis in
negotiating future trade deals.”1 He further directed USTR to begin pursuing
“bilateral trade negotiations to promote American industry, protect American
workers, and raise American wages.”2
The President’s background in private business traces a path of real estate
deals exhibiting his approach to most decision making. It is often said that
he has a “transactional” rather than a strategic perspective. He has the
reputation of a shrewd businessman who makes decisions quickly—some say
impulsively—based on his assessment of the transaction at hand, viewing his
goals in every deal as a zero-sum game. One side wins and the other side
necessarily loses. Generally, the businessman’s goals are narrowly focused
on maximizing monetary profit for immediate or long-term gain. Within the
bounds of fiduciary responsibilities and legal and ethical rules, this focus is
appropriate to satisfy shareholders, business partners, and personal needs.
Every tool, from economic dominance to filing bankruptcy, can be employed
to gain leverage for winning or preserving profit. In a private trade
transaction, it is understandable that the businessperson may be able to bring
greater leverage in a one-on-one, bilateral transaction negotiating with a
party with fewer resources, rather than try to reach agreement with multiple
parties with diverse interests and potentially enhanced leverage with
combined resources.
In the political economy of the post-World War II era, however, the
United States has been the principal architect of the nondiscriminatory
multilateral trading system in an effort to promote and sustain economic
stability among scores of state actors with economies engaged in rules-based,
free market trade. A critical question immediately comes to mind from the
Trump administration’s decision to terminate multilateral trade agreements
and direct USTR to focus engagement on bilateral, country-by-country trade
1
Memorandum on Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).
2
Id.; Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Details Plan to Rewrite Global Trade Rules, TIME,
http://time.com/4385989/donald-trump-trade-china-speech/ (last updated June 28, 2016).
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agreements: Is this the beginning of the end of the rules-based liberal
economic order created in the post-war years to settle disputes and reduce
discriminatory trade barriers through a multilateral trading system?
II. CORDELL HULL AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE MULTILATERAL
SYSTEM
Most of the free world has lived under the economic stability of the
predominantly nondiscriminatory trading system of the multilateral General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) initiated in 1948, which has
continued under the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. This
system was constructed on the ruins not only of two world wars, but the trade
wars of the interwar years and the Great Depression. When Franklin D.
Roosevelt defeated President Herbert Hoover in the 1932 election, at the
onset of the Depression, he selected as his Secretary of State Senator Cordell
Hull (D-TN), who led the long struggle to create this system. Hull, as a
congressman in 1916, had begun calling for an “international trade congress”
to be formed among all commercial nations to promote peace through fair
trade and the avoidance of trade warfare.3
An ardent life-long proponent of free trade, Hull led the opposition on the
Ways and Means Committee against the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930 that brought U.S. protective tariff levels to nearly the highest levels
in history and provoked retaliatory trade measures against American exports
in an already depressed world economy.4 In an era when the United States
had the largest, but also the most protected, market in the world and other
nations engaged in trade wars or traded on mercantilist principles of bilateral
barter, Secretary of State Hull began slowly to bring tariffs down and
transform the trading system one country at a time using broad authority
granted by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934.
Hull waged the struggle to create this system against both domestic and
foreign opposition forces. Unlike the battles Hull had waged against
protectionist Republicans in Congress—who had fiercely protected domestic
manufacturers against imports since the Civil War—his trade opponents
were often found within his own party. Although President Roosevelt
supported a more liberal trade program, Hull was forced into internecine
3

42 CONG. REC. 10,653–54 (July 8, 1916).
For a discussion of Smoot-Hawley Act generally, its comparative tariff levels and
retaliation against it, see C. DONALD JOHNSON, THE WEALTH OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF
TRADE POLITICS IN AMERICA 190–204 (2018); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM:
SMOOT-HAWLEY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 105–08 (2011); JOSEPH M. JONES, JR., TARIFF
RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL 35–53, 75, 112–40, 211 (1934).
4
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combat with some of the New Deal insiders of the Roosevelt administration
who saw Hull’s trade idealism as a distraction, at best, from their domestic
programs addressing unemployment. The New Dealers’ solutions were
focused on increasing domestic purchasing power, and trade promotion
policy was not among those solutions. Generally viewed as economic
nationalists, the New Deal planners were not enamored by free trade
philosophy, and, in fact, they feared that a focus on tariff reform might be at
cross purposes with their own domestic recovery plans. In the second year
of the Roosevelt Administration, however, Hull overcame most of the New
Deal opposition to his trade program when FDR enthusiastically proposed
and easily passed the RTAA through Congress.5
Nevertheless, a major new internal problem developed after Roosevelt
appointed George N. Peek in December 1933 to be his special assistant on
foreign trade. Much of the trade policy debate throughout 1934 and 1935
was dominated by the conflict between Hull’s internationalist approach and
Peek’s nationalistic perspective. Peek was a former farm implement
manufacturer who had been vice president of John Deere and Company and
president of the Moline Plow Company. A firm believer in maintaining a
favorable balance of trade through export subsidies and dumping surplus
agriculture products in foreign markets, Peek had been trying to implement
his trade beliefs as head of the Agriculture Adjustment Administration
(AAA) even before becoming FDR’s foreign trade assistant in the White
House. At the AAA, he came into direct conflict with Secretary of
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Undersecretary Rex Tugwell. Wallace
had become one of Hull’s allies on trade. Wallace’s influential pamphlet,
America Must Choose, supporting the RTAA, had even attracted the
endorsement of Henry L. Stimson, Hoover’s Secretary of State.6 Tugwell,
one of the original members of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust and a New Deal
economist, was no friend to Hull’s laissez-faire trade policies, which
Tugwell considered anachronistic, but he strongly opposed Peek’s export
dumping proposals because he was attempting to raise farm prices and
reduce surplus agriculture through domestic production controls. Tugwell
advised Wallace that dumping American farm exports would only provoke
retaliation.
5

78 CONG. REC. 3,579-80 (Mar. 2, 1934); Tariff Bill Voted by Senate, 57 to 33; Adjournment
Dims, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1934), https://www.nytimes.com/1934/06/05/archives/tariff-bill-vote
d-by-senate-57-to-33-adjournment-dims-house-adopts.html.
6
H.L. Stimson Urges Tariff Authority for the President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1934), https://
www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/hl-stimson-urges-tariff-authority-for-the-president-hoov
ers.html; HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR
298–99 (1948).
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Roosevelt often chose subordinates with conflicting views so that he
could play one against the other and be free to make his own decisions. The
President’s selection of Peek, first perhaps to counterbalance Wallace and
then to spar with Hull, suited his decision-making process. George Peek saw
in his new job in the White House an opportunity to take over trade policy
coordination and to neutralize Hull’s liberal trade goals. While Hull was out
of the country, Peek submitted a plan to the President for reorganization of
the administration’s trade policy apparatus which put him at the helm.
Opposition to Peek’s plan came naturally from the State Department, and
Wallace joined Commerce Secretary Daniel C. Roper in weighing in on
Hull’s side against Peek’s proposal. Roosevelt ultimately confirmed that
Hull and the State Department would be in charge of RTAA trade
negotiations, but not before he further entrenched Peek as a problem for Hull
by naming him head of the newly created Office of the Special Adviser on
Foreign Trade. Further, the President endowed Peek’s office with a huge
budget for statistical analysis and appointed him president of the newly
established Export-Import Bank of Washington (Exim Bank). The Exim
Bank was created initially to finance export sales to the Soviet Union and
Cuba, but Peek immediately began to use it to pursue his own trade program,
which ran diametrically counter to Hull’s efforts.
For Hull, a critical aspect of the trade program was the requirement he
had imposed that agreements under the RTAA be negotiated under the
unconditional “most-favored-nation” (MFN) principle—that is, on a
nondiscriminatory basis with all trading partners that did not discriminate
against the United States. This requirement allowed Hull to multilateralize
the tariff reductions obtained in bilateral agreements. Simply stated, it
worked as follows: If in bilateral negotiations with country X, the United
States agreed to reduce tariffs on a particular product, it committed also to
grant this tariff reduction on the same product from all other countries that
maintained nondiscriminatory tariffs on imports from the United States.
Likewise, if country X later reduced the tariff on a product for a third country
below the rate established in the agreement with the United States, country X
committed to grant the same reduction on that product when imported from
the United States. Thus, among the group of nations that practiced
nondiscriminatory trade policies, trade restrictions reduced in bilateral
agreements benefited all trade.
MFN clauses had been included in bilateral trade agreements for
centuries. The principle was employed in the first United States treaty, a
1788 agreement with France, and in the controversial Jay Treaty with Great
Britain in 1794. George Washington endorsed the concept in his famous
Farewell Address, in which he declared “our commercial policy should hold
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an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or
preferences.”7 But since the eighteenth century most of these clauses were
employed in a conditional form. Under this practice, concessions granted by
the United States in bilateral trade agreements were extended to third
countries only on the condition that the third country “pay” for them by
granting concessions of equivalent value to the United States. Although the
conditional approach sounds reasonable in theory, the practical effect of
requiring specific payments for nondiscriminatory trade concessions
produced perpetual market distortions as countries haggled over an
acceptable “price” for each concession in negotiations that had to be repeated
every time a country granted a new concession undercutting rates included in
previous agreements. Even when an agreement resolved the distortion in
rates, exporters lost market share during the period of discrimination, and the
process was never-ending. The conditional approach also made broad tariff
reductions difficult, if not impossible, to implement.
During the Harding administration, Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes finally abandoned the use of conditional MFN policy in favor of the
unconditional approach. Under Secretary Hughes the United States signed
the first unconditional MFN agreement with Germany in December 1923 and
converted a number of existing preferential agreements to nondiscriminatory
arrangements. But as exorbitant rates—guarded by ardent Republican
Senate protectionists—prevailed in the decade that followed, there was little
interest in or hope for ratification of trade agreements of any kind. Many
agreements with major trading partners, such as Great Britain, continued in
the conditional format, and some agreements had no MFN provision at all, as
was the case with Canada.
In stark contrast to Hull’s almost religious fervor for an international
trading system with reduced barriers and no preferences or discrimination,
George Peek saw the reciprocal trade program as an opportunity to sell
surplus American products through one-on-one horse trading for national
advantage without regard to broader multilateral implications. He urged the
President to “return to the traditional realistic policy of conditional mostfavored-nation treatment,” charging that Hull’s unconditional MFN policy
amounted to “unconditional economic disarmament.”8 The RTAA provided
that duties arrived at under the contemplated agreements and proclaimed
under the Act would apply to imports from “all foreign countries” except
countries that discriminated against American commerce and Cuba, which

7

FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, THE WAY FORWARD: THE AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM 100 (1939).
8
GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FIGHT FOR FARM PARITY 276 (1954).
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had an established U.S. tariff preference program. This provision appears to
have supported Hull’s view, but the language was vague enough for
alternative interpretations, especially in view of the Act’s express purpose of
“expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States.”9
For a period of time, there was some uncertainty as to which approach the
President favored after he told a press conference that with most nations
having withdrawn into a policy of economic nationalism and selfsufficiency, his best hope for the trade program was “to get some special
agreements with different countries . . . on a barter basis.”10 In midDecember 1934, Hull received an urgent message that the President had
tentatively approved a barter agreement just negotiated by Peek with
Germany. Essentially, the agreement provided for the sale of 800,000 bales
of cotton under a complicated formula that allowed the Germans to pay onefourth of the price to the Exim Bank (under Peek’s leadership) in dollars and
the remainder in Deutschmarks. The bank would then sell the German
currency at a discount to American importers exclusively for the purchase of
wine, fertilizer, and other goods from Germany. Under the fiercely
nationalistic economic policies implemented by German Chancellor Adolph
Hitler and his Minister of Economics and Reichsbank President, Dr. Hjalmar
H.G. Schacht, to finance German recovery and rearmament, Germany was
entering into a number of these bilateral barter arrangements. Schacht had
recently announced that Germany would terminate its unconditional MFN
commitment with the United States. Peek’s deal effectively subsidized
German exports to the United States, thus discriminating against competing
exports from other foreign sources.
Hull was shocked and outraged. He knew that Peek had been negotiating
with the Germans but was preoccupied with his own negotiations with
Brazil, which he hoped would lead to the first agreement under the RTAA.11
If the German deal went through, it would stop the Brazilian negotiations in
their tracks and potentially destroy Hull’s entire trade program. The actual
bilateral trade implications of the potential agreement with Brazil were not
significant. To Hull, however, the issue was much bigger than bilateral trade
benefits. The US–Brazil agreement—one committed to unconditional MFN
treatment with the largest economy in Latin America—would lay the
9

SAYRE, supra note 7, at 205–06.
ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1932–1945,
at 92 (1995).
11
While the first trade agreement concluded after the RTAA was signed into law was a
preferential agreement with Cuba, negotiations on that agreement began before Roosevelt sent
the trade agreements bill to Congress, and its terms were not part of Hull’s MFN trade
program.
10
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cornerstone for his policy in the Americas. It would also make an important
statement promoting his goal of ending trade restrictions in a new world
economic order. In a seven-to-one vote of the interagency committee
approving Hull’s draft proposal for the Brazilian trade agreement, Peek was
the lone dissenter. Despite his apparent drift toward Peek’s point of view,
the President approved Hull’s draft agreement with Brazil.
When the Brazilian negotiators got word of the deal that Peek was
making with the Germans, they submitted a protest to the State Department
with a reminder that Brazil was also a major cotton exporter and that they
had been stalling a German delegation seeking the same preferential barter
with Brazil. If the United States went through with the German agreement,
the Brazilians said that they would have to accept their own German offer
and defer negotiations with the United States indefinitely. Other countries
followed with reprisal threats in reaction to the possibility of American
preferential treatment for German imports that were competitive with their
own. Chile, for instance, threatened to dump its fertilizer on the American
market if it had to in order to compete with the German product shipped
under preferential conditions.
Hull met with the President and presented the case that the German
agreement posed a devastating threat to the Brazilian negotiations and to all
other possible agreements under the Act. He believed that the agreement
contravened the RTAA’s provision requiring equality of commercial
treatment and that the Act did not contemplate discriminatory barter
transactions. The Secretary argued that a deal giving discriminatory market
access to German imports was not even necessary to sell American cotton to
Germany—a country desperate for cotton. He thought the Germans, who
were openly in default on two billion dollars in debt to the United States,
were acting in bad faith in seeking a trade agreement with a creditor they had
previously snubbed. The agreement was, Hull said, “a very good trade
bargain for Germany, but with little gain and large risks for the United
States. . . . The proposed plan is almost certain to engender extreme
resentment among that large section of the American public which is
violently opposed to the Hitler regime.”12 Under the weight of Hull’s
argument, affirmed by the support of all of the relevant cabinet secretaries,
Roosevelt relented and withdrew his approval of Peek’s agreement.
Most of the national media and economic scholars favored Hull’s policy,
derisively referring to the views of his opponent as “Peekonomics.”13 The
12
CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 373–74 (1948); see also Divided
Counsels, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1935), https://www.nytimes.com/1935/05/13/archivees/divid
ed-counsels.html.
13
FITE, supra note 8, at 279.
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Washington Post called Peek’s plan “essentially unworkable” and said Hull’s
was on “strong ground” and the only one that offered any expectation of
future trade expansion.14 But Peek had his own political and academic
supporters, mainly from the isolationist and protectionist camps. The
influential historian and later a prominent isolationist critic of FDR, Charles
A. Beard, called Peek “the realist among the administration men engaged on
the foreign trade side,” observing that “Peek’s mind does not seem to be
encumbered by a thousand exploded economic dogmas that no longer fit the
world of reality.”15 Peek continued publicly and ruthlessly to disparage the
State Department’s trade policies. At an Armistice Day speech, he finally
stepped over the line. He declared that the choice for the United States on
trade policy and a broad range of other issues was between Americanism and
internationalism. “When we Americans choose—let us choose America,”16
he concluded, implying that the administration was moving in an unAmerican direction with laissez-faire policies that opened U.S. markets to
foreign advantage. The pro-Republican Washington Herald reported on
Peek’s speech highlighting the slanted details of the choice with a supporting
editorial headlined, “Sane Nationalism or Fatuous Internationalism—Which
Shall It Be?”17 Roosevelt reacted with a letter to Peek, denouncing his
misrepresentations of administration policy, calling the speech “rather silly,”
and claiming it sounded “like a Hearst paper.” The President even
denounced one point in Peek’s speech as “a deliberate lie.”18 When Peek
offered his resignation, the President promptly accepted. With Peek’s
departure, Hull and his trade policy had finally triumphed within the
Roosevelt administration.
Hull’s victory over Peek marked a turning point for his trade program,
which now embedded internationalism into the economic fabric of the New
Deal and signaled the beginning of a revolution in the governance of world
trade. With his trade philosophy now predominant and unchallenged within
the administration, Hull signed the Brazilian agreement and secured
unconditional MFN agreements with eight countries by the end of 1935. But
success for his ultimate goals remained far from certain on the road ahead.
The Brazil deal drew virulent reaction from American manufacturers of
products competing with imports receiving tariff concessions under the
14

Mr. Hull and Mr. Peek, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1934; see also Divided Counsels, supra
note 12.
15
FITE, supra note 8, at 279.
16
Id. at 281.
17
Sane Nationalism or Fatuous Internationalism—Which Shall It Be?, WASH. HERALD,
Nov. 26, 1935.
18
FITE, supra note 8, at 284–85.
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agreement. Prompted by Peek, domestic producers worried about the MFN
benefits to third country imports and brought their concerns to Congress
where bipartisan criticism began to grow, forcing Hull and Roosevelt to
combat this criticism each time the RTAA came up for renewal.
At the same time, countries began lining up to become a part of the
American MFN system to get out from under the Smoot-Hawley rates
imposed on imports from countries without a nondiscriminatory trade
agreement with the United States. Under Hull’s leadership, the trade
program, now more than ever, emphasized the broader goal of expanding
world trade through a wider application of nondiscriminatory MFN treatment
over the promotion of specific bilateral trade objectives. Ironically, in
negotiating the development of this system, the strongest foreign opposition
force with which Hull and his successors at the State Department contended
came from their allies in the Anglo-American special relationship that
emerged during the same time period.
To a large extent, Hull based his trade program on nineteenth century
British free trade policies, which the U.K. government ultimately abandoned
after World War I. Hull’s goals now ran counter to the trade policies that
Britain increasingly pursued in the 1930s, including, most importantly, the
imperial preference system adopted at the Ottawa Imperial Conference of
1931, which was implemented largely in reaction to the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930. The discriminatory preferences created a sterling bloc
within the British Commonwealth that effectively denied access to American
exports and restricted necessary raw materials otherwise available from the
dominions of the Empire.
Trade agreements Britain had recently concluded with Argentina,
Germany, Italy, and other countries outside the Commonwealth were strictly
designed to balance trade on a purely bilateral, barter basis, thus limiting
commerce with other nations and obstructing the expansion of multinational
trade. Early in 1936, Hull began lecturing the British Ambassador to
Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, on the importance of his program to
international peace and prosperity. He cited the sacrifice made by the United
States of vast quantities of American cotton exports when it rejected the Peek
barter arrangement with Germany that was similar to the current British
agreements. In addition, he referred to the absence of a barter requirement in
the U.S.-Brazil agreement, an approach, Hull noted, that allowed Brazil to
use the proceeds from exports to the United States, regardless of bilateral
trade balances, to buy U.K. or other nations’ exports and increase
multilateral trade. He estimated that there was room for a $20 billion
increase in international trade, which could provide employment for twelve
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to fourteen million people and “would probably mark the difference between
war and peace in Europe in the not distant future.”19
The British were not moved by Hull’s sermons, especially as they
emanated from a senior official representing a country still maintaining
prohibitive tariffs at the world’s highest levels. Opposition to returning to
nondiscriminatory trade policies came principally from the British Treasury
and Board of Trade, whose senior officials were skeptical of the likelihood
that American protectionism would diminish. Neville Chamberlain, then
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the son of the imperialist Member of
Parliament Joseph Chamberlain, who as Colonial Secretary at the turn of the
twentieth century had led a failed movement promoting imperial preferences
and urged an end to British free trade policies. After a difficult period of
negotiations, Hull finally reached a modest trade agreement with Britain,
which included some minor breaches in the preferential wall around the
Empire in November 1938. The effective lifespan of this agreement was
short due to Britain’s declaration of war in September 1939, but the issues
raised by the imperial preferences lived on as a stumbling block for future
U.S.-U.K. negotiations for years.
The nondiscriminatory trade principle came up on important occasions in
the development of the special Anglo-American relationship during and after
World War II. Dealing with the legal limitations of neutrality imposed by
Congress and a cash-short Britain, Roosevelt came up with the Lend-Lease
military aid program that did not require Britain to pay for the aid in dollars
or loans. Rather, the provisions of the Act authorizing Lend-Lease allowed
“payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect
benefit which the President deems satisfactory.”20 With Hull and the State
Department overseeing how the “indirect benefit,” commonly referred to
later as “the Consideration,”21 would be defined after the hostilities ended,
this provision would have a huge impact on post-war economic restructuring.
Hull immediately seized on the language as leverage to eliminate the
Commonwealth’s imperial preferences in future trade negotiations—leverage
he did not have in reaching the pre-war bilateral trade agreement with
Britain. With this provision in the Lend-Lease Act, the State Department
sought to define the Consideration for Lend-Lease aid as a commitment to
nondiscriminatory trade practices even though the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Aid
Agreement was yet to be negotiated and Congress had not yet approved the
$7 billion appropriation to fund the aid.
19

HULL, supra note 12, at 521.
An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, Pub. L. No. 11, § 3(b), 55 Stat. 32
(1941) (emphasis added).
21
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 12 (2008).
20
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In August 1941, for the first time since each had become head of his
respective government, President Roosevelt met with Prime Minister
Winston Churchill secretly aboard war ships in Placentia Bay off the coast of
Newfoundland in what would become known as the Atlantic Conference.
Roosevelt had been planning the meeting for months in order to discuss war
aims. It was his intention to issue a joint declaration aimed at educating the
American public as to what was at stake in the conflict and to generate public
opinion against isolationists in Congress. Churchill also enthusiastically
desired the meeting but with a more specific purpose in mind—tying the
United States to the war effort. After several days of meetings, the two
leaders issued an unsigned joint declaration, later dubbed the “Atlantic
Charter,” setting forth the guiding principles “on which they base their hopes
for a better future” in the post-war world. While the meeting began molding
the intimate personal relationship between the two leaders that became
vitally important to the future alliance and prosecution of the war, it also
drew attention to the stark differences each leader represented in his
historical outlook on world affairs and, in particular, on imperialism. This
difference was manifested in the drafting of the provision of the declaration
guaranteeing post-war access to equal trade to all nations.
Roosevelt preferred a requirement that access to trade be “without
discrimination and on equal terms.” Churchill, however, insisted on
language that allowed deference to the Ottawa Agreement preferences,
arguing that the nondiscrimination commitment would require convening a
conference of the British Commonwealth for approval. This would take
time, which neither party had, because Churchill wanted to begin the aid
flow as soon as possible and Roosevelt wanted the declaration released
promptly to begin using it to mobilize domestic support for his efforts on
behalf of the allied cause against Hitler. Against persistent opposition from
the State Department (Hull did not attend due health issues), the President
finally gave in to Churchill and accepted the following language for the
paragraph describing the trade principle:
[The U.S. and the U.K.] will endeavor, with due respect for
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States,
great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms,
to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are
needed for their economic prosperity;22

22
Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 3 Bevans 686, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/w
wii/atlantic.asp.
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Although the principle called for trade to be “on equal terms,” it did not
expressly prohibit “discrimination” and included the phrase urged by
Churchill, “with due respect for their existing obligations,” a loophole
allowing the Ottawa preferences to survive.
On February 23, 1942, the British signed the Mutual Aid Agreement
containing the following language in Article VII describing the
Consideration for Lend-Lease aid:
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the
United States of America by the Government of the United
Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress
of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be
such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but
to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between
them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To
that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the
United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to
participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the
expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures,
of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption
of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and
welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and in general, to
the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the
Joint Declaration made on Aug. 12, 1941 [the Atlantic
Charter], by the President of the United States of America and
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.23
In a message sent to Churchill, urging the British Cabinet to approve
Article VII, Roosevelt assured them that the United States was not asking for
a commitment in advance to abolish Empire preference.24 This message
cleared the logjam blocking settlement of the Lend-Lease aid agreement, but
it clouded the meaning of Article VII, which would be a critical element and
a source of much friction in postwar trade negotiations. While many in the
State Department would persistently cite the provision as a commitment to
23

Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement, U.S.-U.K., art. VII, Feb. 28, 1942, 56 Stat. 1433,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/angam42.asp (emphasis added).
24
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1942, GENERAL; THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: THE FAR EAST, VOL. I, at 535–36 (1960), https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1942v01.
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end the discriminatory imperial preferences, the British, equally inaccurately,
recorded in their Cabinet minutes that Roosevelt had affirmed that there was
no such commitment and that these preferences “should be excluded from
our discussions.”25
The difficult Anglo-American negotiations over discriminatory trade
preferences and MFN did not end when the United States entered the war
and the special relationship was enhanced by a military alliance. The tough
trade negotiations continued during and after the war, even as the United
States came to the financial aid of Britain to alleviate the destruction and
depletion of resources caused by the war. Temporary exceptions were
allowed in the GATT for reconstruction, development, and the
Commonwealth preference arrangements. Yet, despite the objections of the
British and other countries seeking preferential arrangements and permanent
exceptions from the rules, Cordell Hull and his disciples at the State
Department, such as Will Clayton, the first Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs, infused the nondiscriminatory trade principles in the
commercial policy provisions of the GATT. The unconditional MFN
principle, requiring nondiscriminatory treatment among all the GATT
contracting parties, is firmly established in Article I, the cornerstone of the
agreement and now of the WTO. A national treatment standard also required
nondiscriminatory treatment between imported and domestically produced
goods with respect to internal taxation and regulation. Standards on
antidumping and countervailing duties procedures, as well as safeguard
measures under the escape clause and other measures, were provided to
establish a code of nondiscriminatory practices for the contracting parties.26
These principles were not new to the British; their experts had
collaborated with the State Department in formulating the Proposals for the
failed International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter in 1945. Hull had
included similar provisions in trade agreements negotiated under the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the British had employed
nondiscriminatory principles before retreating from free trade after the First
World War. The senior experts from the United States and the United
Kingdom had collaborated with common objectives in 1942–1943 as they
began crafting the outline for a “Commercial Union” and a multilateral trade
agreement in pursuit of the economic goals for the post-war world described
25
L.S. PRESSNELL, EXTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE THE WAR: VOL 1: THE POST-WAR
FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT 59 (1987).
26
For a thorough discussion of the GATT provisions, their negotiation history, and legal
significance see KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); IRWIN
ET AL., supra note 21.
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in the Atlantic Charter. The devastating impact of the war on the world’s
economy, however, made these plans less practicable. Most of the countries
participating in the U.N. Preparatory Conferences during 1946–1947 in
London and New York, which led to the GATT agreement in Geneva and the
ITO talks in Havana in 1948, did so either to avoid being left out of
assistance programs such as the Marshall Plan or to avoid being excluded
from any trade deal organized by the United States (the country with the
largest import market in the world). Few were drawn to these negotiations
because they shared, with Hull, Clayton, and the presidents they served, the
belief that freer trade under uniform principles of fair-dealing set out in the
GATT or the draft ITO Charter would bring economic stability and
prosperity to the world and underpin American prosperity. Only the United
States had the economic strength and dedicated interest to carry this longterm strategy of building a nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system
with such broad goals.27
III. THE TRUMP TRADE DOCTRINE
The trade goals of the Trump administration, even as they first emerged
during the 2016 presidential election, are much more narrowly focused than
the broad strategic goals of the Roosevelt-Truman State Department. As
senior policy advisors to the Trump campaign in September 2016, Wilbur
Ross, now Secretary of Commerce, and Peter Navarro, an economics
professor at the University of California-Irvine business school and currently
a senior trade advisor in the White House, issued a report, “Scoring the
Trump Economic Plan,” in rebuttal to the conclusion reached in the nonpartisan (though conservative “supply-side” analysis) by the Tax Foundation
of Trump’s tax plan.28 The Tax Foundation Report predicted that Trump’s
plan would cost $2.6 trillion in revenue losses to the U.S. Treasury. The
Ross-Navarro Report called the Tax Foundation Report “incomplete and
highly misleading,” because it isolates the tax cuts from revenue offsets they
predict will come from Trump’s “synergistic suite of trade, regulatory, and
energy policy reforms.”29
27

For a more thorough discussion of negotiations of Anglo-American trade negotiations,
including the postwar GATT and International Trade Organization negotiations, see JOHNSON,
supra note 4, at 314–402.
28
Alan Cole, Details and Analysis of the Donald Trump Tax Reform Plan, TAX
FOUNDATION (Sept. 19, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/details-analysis-donald-trump-tax-pla
n-2016/.
29
Peter Navarro & Wilbur Ross, Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory &
Energy Policy Impacts, DONALD J. TRUMP 1, 2 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.
com/Trump_Economic_Plan.pdf.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

706

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

5/11/2018 5:41 PM

[Vol. 46:691

On the trade piece, Ross and Navarro argue that Trump’s “tough, smart”
negotiators will renegotiate every one of the “poorly negotiated trade deals,”
dating “back to at least 1993,” coinciding with presidency of William J.
Clinton.30 Renegotiations would be conducted according to the “Trump
Trade Doctrine,” which they defined as ensuring that “any deal must increase
the GDP growth rate, decrease the trade deficit, and strengthen the U.S.
manufacturing base.”31 The deals to be renegotiated include not only
NAFTA and other regional and bilateral free trade agreements completed
under Presidents Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, but also
the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Ross and
Navarro propose that the WTO be amended to favor and give more control to
the United States based upon its leverage as the largest importer, third-largest
exporter, and currently the largest economy in the world. They boldly
forecast that the Trump Trade Doctrine will eliminate the overall U.S. trade
deficit of $500 billion, end off-shoring of American jobs, and rebuild
America’s manufacturing base. Suffice to say, it will take more than “smart,
tough” negotiators to pull off this miraculous trifecta, but they do not stop
there with bold predictions.
In addition to the increased revenue they project to be derived from
regulatory and energy reforms, the Report predicts that Trump’s trade
policies alone will produce $2.44 trillion in revenues to offset the revenue
loss from the proposed tax cut.32 The President called Navarro “a visionary
economist”33 when he selected him to serve as the White House inside guru
on trade policy, but more realistic experts would describe this paper as
offering only delusions of grandeur.
Navarro explained his approach to eliminating the trade deficit to the
Wall Street Journal in terms that would be familiar to the eighteenth century
mercantilists and to the Germans during the inter-war years under Hitler’s
fiercely nationalistic Minister of Economics H.H.G. Schacht, who negotiated
bilateral barter agreements. It is the very approach Secretary of State Cordell
Hull fought against in the 1930s when establishing the nondiscriminatory
trade program under the RTAA beginning in 1934. “Any country we have
significant trade deficit with needs to work with us on a product-by-product
and sector-by-sector level,” Navarro declared, “to reduce that deficit over a

30

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 17.
32
Id. at 19.
33
James Pethokoukis, My Old, but Still Fascinating (!), Chat with Trump’s Trade Guru,
Peter, AEI (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/my-old-but-still-fascinating-chatwith-trumps-trade-guru-peter-navarro/.
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specified period of time.”34 This simple formula might seem reasonable in a
government-controlled, nonmarket economy ruled by National Socialism or
communism, but it is less than practical in a market-driven economy. Trade
agreements are about balancing the legal rules of trade; they are not intended
to change the economics of supply and demand. Navarro, following
Trump’s political instincts, seems most interested in trying to exploit the
trade deficit for political gain, regardless of its economic relevance to the
U.S. economy.
At the end of March, President Trump signed an executive order requiring
a “systematic evaluation” of all bilateral trade deficits and all free trade
agreements (FTAs), including the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the WTO, to determine the impact of these agreements and
whether there have been violations, abuses, and what actions need to be
taken with respect to them.35 The President put Secretary Wilbur Ross in
charge of the evaluation, and Ross attempted to explain the project to the
press assembled in the White House Briefing Room the day before the
signing. Like Navarro, Ross focused on the bilateral trade deficits because
that is where the President directed his focus. But of the countries with
whom the United States has the top ten largest deficits, only two were
involved in United States’ free trade agreements, but all were in the WTO—
China ($347 billion), Japan ($69 billion), Germany ($65 billion), Mexico
($63 billion), Ireland ($36 billion), Vietnam ($32 billion), Italy ($28.5
billion), South Korea ($28 billion), Malaysia ($25 billion), and India ($24
billion).36
Frankly, Ross showed surprisingly little understanding of the
nondiscrimination principle that is a cornerstone of the GATT/WTO system,
saying:
[T]he President has talked a lot about [reciprocity]; namely if
we have a country that has big trade barriers against us, we
should logically have similar trade barriers against
them. . . . The only problem is, the World Trade Organization
has what’s called a “most favored nation clause,” meaning that

34
Bob Davis, To Reduce Trade Deficit, White House Wants Partners to Buy American,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-reduce-trade-deficit-white-housewants-partners-to-buy-american-1489020691.
35
Doug Palmer, Trump on Trade: Scrutinize NAFTA, Other Deals for ‘Abuses,’ POLITICO
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/28/trump-trade-nafta-abuses-237777.
36
Trump Orders Review of U.S. Trade Deficits with All Nations, Including Japan, JAPAN
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/01/national/trump-tells-offi
cials-review-causes-u-s-trade-deficits/#.WrkEpdPwY1g.
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of all the countries with whom we do not have a free-trade
agreement, we must charge the same tariff on the same item to
those . . . countries as we charge to the others. So that’s a
significant impediment toward getting to anything like a
reciprocal agreement.37
Secretary Ross seems to have missed the point that Secretary of State
Hull entered into numerous bilateral agreements based upon reciprocity
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act with the MFN clause central to
the agreement to ensure that the United States would benefit from future
tariff reduction granted by its trading partners. The point he seems to be
making here is that he favors returning to the period when discriminatory
actions were permissible and trade wars were prevalent. As noted earlier, the
Navarro/Ross paper written during the campaign called for fundamental
amendments to the WTO agreements based upon the leverage held by the
United States as the number one importer in the world, the number three
exporter, and with a trade deficit that equals the cumulative surplus of the
rest of the world. Citing this leverage again to the press, Ross said, “I
wouldn’t dismiss the potential for seeking modification.”38 Although any
such amendment seems unlikely, it is a very troubling proposition for those
concerned about maintaining the liberal world trade order and the economic
stability developed after the Second World War.
IV. LIGHTHIZER AND THE WTO
Statutorily, the central figure on the Trump trade team is the President’s
pick to lead USTR, Robert E. Lighthizer, despite the leading role played by
Secretary Ross during Lighthizer’s long confirmation process. An affable
and highly competent trade lawyer-lobbyist, Lighthizer is arguably the most
qualified of any of Trump’s initial cabinet appointees in terms of direct
experience and specialized talent. If the president is serious about
dismantling the established liberal trade order and replacing it with a
nationalistic, protectionist regime armed and ready for the trade wars to
follow, he has chosen in Lighthizer a master technician equipped and
possibly willing to lead the effort. After a substantial tenure on Capitol Hill
as chief counsel and staff director on the Senate Finance Committee under
Chairman Bob Dole in the early 1980s, Lighthizer served for several years as
37
Press Release, Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Commerce, Press Briefing by Secretary of Commerce
Wilbur Ross on an Executive Order of Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses (Apr. 28, 2017),
http://globaltraderelations.net/images/Article.Trump.Ross_Statement_April_ 28,_2017_.pdf.
38
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Deputy USTR under President Ronald Reagan. Reagan normally talked like
a free trader but often walked like a protectionist with Lighthizer leading the
march. At a time when Japan was the most threatening trade ogre to
American industry—the role now played by China—Reagan bashed Japan
with every protectionist tool in the USTR arsenal.
Much later, in private practice on the protectionist side, Lighthizer
testified before the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee in 2007
that the United States was being treated unfairly in the WTO dispute
settlement system.39 He called the system “fundamentally flawed” with
“rogue” WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions exceeding their mandate
and engaging in “judicial activism,” a term no doubt employed to conjure up
memories among conservatives of the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Earl Warren.40 He charged that these decisions were “gutting our
trade laws,” citing two instances where WTO decisions ultimately prompted
legislation eliminating U.S. antidumping provisions that had given excessive
advantages to U.S. domestic industry.41 The Manufacturers Alliance for
Productivity and Innovation, however, disputed Lighthizer’s analysis with a
study showing that over the previous five years the United States had
“benefited substantially from its participation in WTO disputes, having
prevailed in twice as many disputes as it lost.”42
In a March 2008 op-ed piece in the New York Times, Lighthizer scolded
the then presumptive Republican presidential nominee Senator John McCain
for citing his unbridled support for free trade to “prove his bona fides as a
conservative.”43
Lighthizer correctly noted that conservatives from
Alexander Hamilton, who, Lighthizer wrote, “could be considered the
founder of American conservatism,” to former Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC)
have opposed free trade. President Reagan, “the personification of modern
conservatism,” according to Lighthizer, “often broke with free-trade
dogma.”44 From his own experience, Lighthizer reminded McCain that
Reagan, despite his “open-markets rhetoric,” restricted imports of
automobiles, steel, sugar, textiles, and motorcycles (to protect Harley39

Legislation Related to Trade with China: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
Comm. on Ways and Means U.S. H.R., 110th Cong. 103-23 (2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-110hhrg49994/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg49994.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Robert E.
Lighthizer]. See also Study Rebuts Claim of U.S. Disadvantage in WTO Dispute Settlement,
INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, May 14, 2008 (source on file with author).
40
Statement of Robert E. Lighthizer, supra note 39, at 116.
41
Id. at 116–17.
42
Study Rebuts Claim of U.S. Disadvantage in WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 39.
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Robert E. Lighthizer, Grand Old Protectionists, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2008), https://www.
nytimes.com/2008/03/06/opinion/06lighthizer.html.
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Davidson); and Reagan “made Japanese imports more expensive” by forcing
Japan to increase the value of the yen.45 Lighthizer declared that free trade is
not the mantra of conservatives; it is rather the ideal of “liberal elites,” like
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), who embrace it “with a passion that makes
Robespierre seem prudent.”46 McCain has a long memory and did not forget
this scolding when Lighthizer came up for confirmation nine years later. He
and Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) sent a long public letter to Lighthizer in a
similarly scolding tone announcing their opposition to his nomination
because of his “vocal advocacy for protectionist shifts in our trade policies,
the Administration’s ongoing, incoherent, and inconsistent trade message,”
and his “skepticism of NAFTA.” They declared, “America deserves a USTR
who will renegotiate NAFTA in order to build on its successes, not as a
pretext for unraveling it.”47
Three years after his op-ed on McCain, Lighthizer had better luck when
he chose to enter the fray supporting the budding Donald Trump presidential
campaign in 2012. In an op-ed in the Washington Times, Lighthizer praised
Trump for his anti-China protectionist rhetoric that was then being criticized
within the GOP. A potential Trump campaign would at least focus attention
on China’s abusive trade practices, Lighthizer predicted, and thus “will have
done a service to both the Republican Party and the country.”48 As a top
lobbyist for the steel industry and lead counsel for the U.S. Steel Corporation
in trade litigation, Lighthizer’s personal views on China and the WTO
offered a legalistic version of Trump’s visceral reactions to trade questions.
During the presidency of Barack Obama, Lighthizer admonished USTR
for “wringing its hands” with China and urged aggressive and imaginative
action to address the U.S.-China trade deficit.
The hand-wringing
characterization of Obama’s USTR was not substantiated in the record.
Obama filed twenty-five WTO cases during his two terms, including sixteen
against China,49 all of which that were decided by the end of his second term
having been won or settled favorably. The aggressive new actions
45
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Robert E. Lighthizer, Lighthizer: Donald Trump Is No Liberal on Trade, WASH. TIMES
(May 9, 2011), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/9/donald-trump-is-no-liber
al-on-trade/.
49
FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration’s Record on the Trade Enforcement, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/fa
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Lighthizer proposed included some that had been rejected by the George W.
Bush and Obama administrations as not sanctioned under the GATT/WTO
agreements.
Defending the aggressive approach, Lighthizer observed, “WTO
commitments are not religious obligations.”50 He argued:
The point is that an unthinking, simplistic and slavish
dedication to the mantra of “WTO-consistency” . . . makes very
little sense, and is plainly not dictated by our international
obligations. Indeed, derogation may be the only way to force
change in the system.51
At the time he made this statement—seven years before he would become
USTR—he stated explicitly, “I am not advocating that the United States
leave the WTO system—that body is too important to us and the global
trading system.”52 A serious question arises, however, considering his lack
of commitment to WTO obligations: Will he be willing to chuck the system
that has effectively provided a rules-based, liberal trade order since 1948
now that he is a member of a team determined to upend the political order
under the slogan of America First?
With strong bipartisan support, Lighthizer was overwhelmingly
confirmed over McCain’s objection.
Even before he was confirmed by the Senate to lead USTR, his influence
was obvious in “The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda,” publically
submitted to Congress by USTR, as required by statute, on March 1, 2017.
This document declares: “It is time for a more aggressive approach. . . . [I]t
is time for a new trade policy that defends American sovereignty.”53 The
new Trump agenda adopts Lighthizer’s view in the same language he
expressed in 2010—that WTO commitments are not “religious
obligations.”54 The agenda explains that “if a WTO dispute settlement
panel—or the WTO Appellate Body—rules against the United States, such a
50
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ruling does not automatically lead to a change in U.S. law or
practice . . . [and] the Trump Administration will aggressively defend
American sovereignty over trade policy.”55 It promises that the Trump
administration “will act aggressively as needed” to combat unfair trade
practices through U.S. trade remedies, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, “when the WTO adopts interpretations of WTO agreements that
undermine the ability of the United States” to employ these remedies.56
I was among the majority of Members of Congress in 1994 who voted for
the Uruguay Round implementing legislation that created the WTO and
vividly remember insisting with others that the legislation make clear that
WTO commitments and dispute decisions would not impact our national
sovereignty and would not be binding on federal or state law.57 The WTO
dispute settlement system, which is arguably the most effective international
legal forum in world history, is based entirely on voluntary participation and
compliance. When a decision goes against the United States and would
require a legislative change for compliance, Congress can ignore the decision
if it so chooses. That was what Congress did when Brazil won a WTO
decision holding U.S. cotton subsidies to be in violation of WTO obligations.
The winning side is authorized under WTO agreements to retaliate against
the offending side by withdrawing trade concessions by, for example, raising
tariffs against the member refusing to comply. In an unusual outcome in the
Brazil cotton case, the United States ultimately reached a monetary
settlement favoring Brazilian farmers and retained the “illegal” subsidies for
its cotton farmers.
Since 1995, the WTO has handled over 500 disputes in a manner that has
enhanced the rules-based trade system and thus maintained global economic
stability. On balance, these WTO decisions have been highly favorable to
U.S. interests. Prior to this system, the old GATT dispute process had
serious weaknesses that made it less useful in the establishment of trade rules
defining unfair trade practices. As I recall as a Ways and Means staff
assistant at the time, Congress, responding to this weakness, enacted Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a mechanism for unilateral enforcement by
the United States of fair trade practices. Among the strong motivations for
creating a new dispute settlement system under the WTO in the Uruguay
Round was the ineffectiveness of the GATT system for settling disputes and
the criticisms against unilateral U.S. actions under Section 301. After 1995,
Section 301 has continued to be used for certain limited purposes, but
55
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expansion of its use as a vigilante-style, unilateral preference over the WTO
dispute settlement process (as arguably contemplated under the
Lighthizer/Trump agenda) poses serious risks of retaliation and trade wars in
a wild-West style environment.
The initial reactions to Trump’s 2017 Trade Agenda following its release
have been mixed. Naturally, the traditional protectionists have responded
positively. The American Alliance for Manufacturing, a partnership between
import-sensitive domestic manufacturers and the United Steelworkers Union,
praised it, observing that the WTO dispute system fails to respect “longstanding recognition of the legitimacy of trade remedies.”58 The reaction on
Capitol Hill, however, has been wary at best from trade leadership of both
Parties. Congressman Richard Neal (D-MA), the ranking Democrat on
Ways and Means, agreed that the WTO dispute system deserves some
criticism but said: “[I]t sounds like the Administration is considering a far
too drastic response. We need to fix the problems with the current
international trading system, not scrap the system altogether.”59
Congressman Kevin Brady (R-TX), chairman of Ways and Means, issued
a statement agreeing with Trump’s effort to make a better deal for American
workers, but defended the WTO:
I strongly believe that our current trade agreements—including
the WTO—have been successful for Americans because these
agreements establish a firm rule of law to hold our competitors
in check and open markets for us to sell our goods, services,
and farm products. However, I agree with President Trump
that we should improve our trade agreements to make them
better serve American workers.60
With this degree of bipartisan support for the WTO in the House, it seems
unlikely that the President would dump that organization as he has the Paris
Climate Agreement, TPP, and other international agreements. Under the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, any member of the Senate or House may
introduce a joint resolution to revoke Congressional approval of the WTO
agreements once every five years. Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) introduced one in
2000; Rep. Paul and Rep. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) tried again in 2005. Neither
58
Brian Flood, Some Push for Tough Approach with WTO, Others Urge Caution, WTO
REPORTER, BLOOMBERG BNA, Mar. 3, 2017.
59
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resolution got many votes. Embarrassingly to me as a Georgian, however,
even though only twenty percent of the House voted in favor of the 2005
resolution, a bipartisan majority of the Georgia delegation voted to revoke
the WTO.61 This was clearly a political throwaway vote. Even if the
resolution had passed both houses (and the Senate has never even considered
such a resolution), every president since the GATT/WTO has existed, except
possibly the present one, would have vetoed it, requiring a two-thirds vote in
both houses to override. Thus, despite the political rhetoric emanating from
the White House, there remains a strong base of political support for the
WTO system under the clouds currently hanging over the system.
As the Trump administration enters its second year, however, the threat it
presents to the stable trading system created seventy years ago under the
persistent ideal of Cordell Hull and the leadership of Roosevelt and Truman
is unmistakable.
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